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Abstract
Computing systems are used in virtually every aspect of our lives. Technology such
as smart phones and electronically controlled subsystems in cars is becoming so com-
monly used that it is virtually ubiquitous. Occasionally, this technology can be ex-
ploited to perform functions that it was never intended to perform, or fail to provide
information that it is supposed to protect. This can allow for the malicious use of
hardware, such as circumventing copyright restrictions or stealing cryptographic keys
that must be kept secret.
In order to protect these computing systems and secure the data held within,
the individual components must be protected. In order to accomplish this goal, this
research performs work in three areas: investigation of circuit vulnerabilities, effec-
tiveness of static protection methods, and the effectiveness and feasibility of using
dynamic protection. Circuit vulnerabilities are explored by extending X-Hot Input
Analysis (X-HIA), a recently proposed blackbox attack method that reduces the num-
ber of input vectors necessary to identify a circuit, allowing for faster identification.
Several previously demonstrated static obfuscation techniques are evaluated against
X-HIA. Dynamic Polymorphic Reconfiguration (DPR), a previously proposed dy-
namic protection method that has not been previously implemented, is realized so
that it can be evaluated.
X-HIA was shown to be effective at identifying several circuit components, in-
cluding a multiplexer and multiplier, in a significantly shorter time than previous
identification methods. Instead of requiring a number of input/output pairings that
grows factorially or exponentially as the circuit size grows, it requires only a number
that grows polynomially with the size of the circuit. This allows for the identification
iv
of significantly larger circuits. Static protection techniques that are applied to the cir-
cuits under test increase the order of that polynomial, but do not increase the amount
of time required to identify the circuit to the point that it is not feasible to perform
that identification. DPR is implemented, and it is shown both that the overhead is
not prohibitive and that it is effective at causing an identification algorithm to fail.
This formalizes a method of protecting circuits from attack: altering a circuit often
enough that the most efficient algorithms are never able to identify it.
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STATIC AND DYNAMIC COMPONENT OBFUSCATION
ON
RECONFIGURABLE DEVICES
I. Introduction
Computing technology pervades nearly every aspect of our lives. Many people
carry internet-connected smart phones with them in order to always maintain their
link to their digital lives. The entertainment industry relies on MP3 players, Blu-Ray
players, and computerized gaming consoles to deliver their content to consumers.
The shift to digital media has undoubtedly increased access to many resources for
many people, but can also be used to circumvent copyright laws or company policies.
Once hackers discovered how the PlayStation 2 (PS2) video-game console functioned,
they were able to produce a ”mod-chip” for it that allowed them to use the system
to play illicit games and software. As Figure 1 shows, the original circuitry was
not replaced[2]. The mod chip attaches to existing circuitry and alters its function,
bypassing the copyright check. Wireless access points can be modified to allow the
broadcasting power to be increased further than the manufacturer recommends. In
short, computing technology is here to stay, and if it not secured, someone will exploit
it for their own good.
1.1 Motivation
Technology plays an increasingly important role in the United States Military.
The military considers any technology that makes a significant contribution to mil-
itary potential to be a Military Critical Technology (MCT)[1]. Compromise of this
1
Figure 1. PlayStation 2 Mod Chip Installation
technology can have disastrous consequences for the end user, such as the enemy be-
ing able to tap into our intelligence feeds[4]. It is tempting to assume that hardware
implementations are invulnerable to attack because they do not feature large easily
observable components like mechanical systems do. This is not the case. The PS2
was likely cracked using brute-force methods. An amazing amount of information
about a system can be obtained by a determined person in their garage, without
fancy equipment. An adversary must only compromise the weakest link in a system
in order to gain access to critical technology (they did not have to break the copy
protection on a DVD, just the DVD player). For this reason, the hardware itself must
be secured against attack.
Attacks come on two varieties: black-box and white-box attacks. While-box at-
tacks occur when the attacker is able to gain access to information about the inside
workings of a circuit and use this information to analyze the circuit whereas during
black-box attack, an attacker only has information about the input-output behavior
of the circuit. Most white box techniques involve partitioning a circuit into likely
components, and then performing black-box identification on those components. For
2
that reason, this research focuses on black-box protection.
The attack against the PS2 was likely a black-box attack. By loading first a
legitimate game, then a illegitimate copy of the same game, and monitoring the
signals between chips, the attackers could deduce which signals prevented the copied
game from being used. Then, a chip was designed that could override these signals
and allow any game to be played. The same modification chip works for several
generations of the PS2, demonstrating that altering the layout of a circuit board does
not provide security if the function of the signals is known.
In the interest of shortening development time and creating more versatile, cost
effective systems, reconfigurable devices such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs) are frequently used. The same qualities that make these devices highly
desirable can also leave them vulnerable to attack. If the computer controlling the
engine in a car can be easily reprogrammed, the dealer can fix design problems simply
and quickly. This same functionality may allow for illicit modifications circumventing
environmental or safety laws.
1.2 Problem Statement
Hardware protection systems all seek to secure an electronic device that may be
out of our physical control. Obviously, the consumer of the technology will be able to
examine it at their leisure. Even if the consumer is trusted (perhaps this would be the
case with a radio that is only sold to the military), the potential exists for the device
to be lost or stolen, and subsequently fall into the hands of a less trustworthy user.
The goal of obfuscation is twofold: to make it difficult or impossible for an adversary
to discover the function of a captured circuit and to ensure that an adversary cannot
easily replicate or modify the captured system.
Current methods of protecting circuitry seek to protect the circuit at either the
3
design stage or the configuration stage of the system. Because this protection only
occurs at a single point in time, and does not change over time, these methods are
referred to as static protection. Because a combinational component can be identified
by enumerating its truth table, an ideal static transformation will require anyone
seeking to identify the circuit to try every possible input combination.
If static protection methods are not adequate, or the cost is too high, then dynamic
methods must be employed. A novel protection concept called Dynamic Polymorphic
Reconfiguration (DPR) that could successfully protect a circuit against black-box
identification methods has been presented but there has been no implementation nor
evaluation performed[14]. Obstacles that must be overcome in order to implement
DPR include defining the transformation frequency as well as formalizing the struc-
ture of the dynamic system, as well as the actual implementation in either an ASIC
or some sort of reconfigurable device. The goal of the dynamic method is to increase
the number of input vectors that must be applied to identify a component beyond the
best static transformation, so that even if all possible inputs are applied to a circuit,
it may still not be identifiable without additional information.
1.3 Contribution
In order to successfully protect a device from unwanted analysis, common devices
are broken down into building blocks, and efficient analysis methods for each building
block are created. The usefulness of static methods against these methods and also
more conventional ones is examined in order to define the requirements of a dynamic
system. Once the requirements for a dynamic system have been established through
analyzing static protection schemes, a framework for DPR (or another dynamic pro-
tection method) to be implemented and tested must be created. This framework may
be specific to the technology being used to implement the dynamic system. Due to
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their speed, flexibility, and widespread use, FPGAs will be used as the platform for
implementing and testing the dynamic protection scheme.
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II. Literature Review
The typical design process for an electronic system involves first specifying the
operation of the system, and then using available technology to meet the requirements.
While this can be an expensive and time consuming process, it is well understood
and practiced regularly.
Conducting this process backwards, or reverse engineering (RE), can be far more
complex. The goal of RE is to discover and describe the operation of a given system.
Theoretically, this can always be accomplished through an exhaustive search, however,
modern systems are sufficiently large that the world’s fastest supercomputer could
not exhaustively test a circuit before the sun burned out.
This chapter is structured as follows: first, the strengths and weaknesses of recon-
figurable computing in general, and FPGAs in particular, are examined in order to
justify their use and the effort of protecting them. Different types of attack methods
are then explored to define what the system being protected may encounter. The spe-
cific methods of attack that this research hopes to defeat, component identification,
is addressed in more detail. Existing methods of component hiding are presented,
and finally the systems on which these techniques will be tested are described.
2.1 Reconfigurable Computing
A reconfigurable computing system is one that is capable of having its operation
defined after it is manufactured. Changing the operation of a device without re-
manufacturing allows for rapid prototyping of digital systems, presenting significant
decreases in the amount of time and money required to iterate through the design
process. As a result, reconfigurable computing platforms are in widespread use. The
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a commonly used, powerful, and versatile
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reconfigurable computing platform.
2.1.1 FPGAs.
An FPGA is an array of reprogrammable gates. The operation performed by each
gate is specified prior to programming the device. FPGAs represent a modern im-
provement on the Programmable Logic Devices (PLDS) and Complex Programmable
Logic Devices (CPLDs) that were created in the 70s and 80s. Modern FPGAs may
contain millions of circuit elements, as well as on-chip application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs) such as arithmetic units or microprocessors to enhance the function
of the device.
Each manufacturer of FPGAs has their own design and nomenclature, but the
basic operation of each is similar. The design of the Xilinx Virtex Series FPGAs is
presented here, but the discussion applies to any FPGA based on lookup table (LUT)
and static random-access memory (SRAM) technology.
The FPGA is constructed of a 2-dimensional array of logic blocks connected by
a routing matrix. Both the logic blocks and the routing matrix are reconfigurable.
Xilinx refers to each of these logic blocks as a Configurable Logic Block, or CLB.
The CLB in turn contains smaller logic elements, termed Slices. Slices within a
CLB can communicate directly with other Slices in the same CLB. Within each slice
are multiple LUTs. These LUTs act as truth tables, translating multiple inputs to
multiple outputs. Each LUT of the Virtex-5 has 6 inputs and 1 output. The LUTs
are paired with flip-flops (FFs) to facilitate the creation of sequential circuit elements.
By specifying the operation to be performed by each LUT as well as the inter-
connections between and within CLBs, virtually any operation can be implemented
on an FPGA. The operation is specified using a netlist, register transfer logic (RTL)
description, hardware description language (HDL), or circuit description. Proprietary
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tools then transform this specification into an FPGA configuration. The output of
these tools can be used to program the FPGA and is referred to as a bitstream. During
its lifetime, an FPGA may be reprogrammed hundreds or even thousands of times.
2.1.2 Run-time and Partial Reconfiguration.
Typically an FPGA is programmed by bringing it offline and transferring the
bitstream to the FPGA. One area of considerable interest is partial reconfiguration, in
which only a portion of the bitstream is modified. This allows the unaffected portions
of the FPGA to continue to function while the programming operation occurs, leading
to increases in performance[7].
This increased flexibility and performance requires a more complex architecture
and tools. Several vendors including Xilinx do offer devices capable of partial re-
configuration, but there are limitations to these capabilities. Typically, a differential
bitstream is generated, which is not desirable when producing dynamically reconfig-
urable circuitry[19]. Current Xilinx tools do not support the exchange of predefined
modules, although this capability was present in previous tools[18]. The module sup-
port that did exist required each module to be stored on the board when the device is
programmed, and new modules could not be introduced without bringing the FPGA
offline. Stone introduced a design where individual LUTs could be reconfigured while
the FPGA was running[22].
Stone’s research is promising but has its own limitations. First, it contains only
16 CLBs, whereas most modern FPGAs contain thousands. Also, while the function
of a CLB or LUT may be dynamically altered, the routing cannot be changed. One
encouraging result is that the reconfiguration circuit can operate at a higher frequency
than the rest of the FPGA, minimizing circuit downtime.
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2.2 Circuit Vulnerabilities
Military Critical Technologies (MCTs) and proprietary hardware must be secured.
Several classes of attacks are possible against both ASICs and FPGAs. Four of these
classes are discussed here: side channel, reverse engineering, invasive techniques, and
semi-invasive techniques. Side channel attacks attempt to indirectly gain access to
proprietary information about a system. Reverse engineering attempts to create a
higher level description of a system in order to better understand it, and therefore
exploit it. Invasive and semi-invasive techniques are the most direct attacks, in that
they physically attack the circuit in order to exploit it.
2.2.1 Side Channel Attacks.
While an operation is being performed by a digital system, measurements such
as time, power consumption, heat signature, and electromagnetic emissions can be
recorded. Side-channel analysis uses these measurements to make inferences about the
operation of the circuit, which can then be used to exploit the circuit. Information
that would not normally be available, such as secret keys, can be obtained using
side-channel analysis.
Simple Power Analysis (SPA)[23] and Differential Power Analysis (DPA)[11] are
commonly employed against cryptographic circuitry. In order to perform this analysis,
the power consumption of a circuit is monitored by recording the voltage drop across a
low-valued resistor inserted between the circuit and the power supply. In some cases,
attacks can be carried out with little knowledge of the circuit itself[13]. Typically the
differences in power consumed by different functional units that carry out arithmetic
operations are quantified, and information about the key can be obtained. SPA
discerns the key directly from the power traces while DPA uses statistical methods
to test likely keys.
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It has been shown that an FPGA is susceptible to correlation power analysis
(CPA)[21]. A block cipher was implemented on a Xilinx FPGA, and the key was
subsequently extracted using statistical analysis of the power consumed by the device.
Sometimes the key can also be extracted by analyzing the amount of time required
to complete an operation. In many RSA implementations a choice is made between
a squaring operation alone or a square followed by a multiply. Obviously, the square
then multiply choice will take longer to execute. Timing analysis was first completed
in 1996[12]. The key can be obtained from a 512-bit RSA encryption unit by recording
and analyzing the time it takes to complete 5000 encryption operations[15].
2.2.2 Reverse Engineering.
One goal of the reverse engineering process is to identify the components within
a system and the relationships between these components[6]. Given a gate level
description of a circuit, it is possible to select a subset of gates that may be a distinct
component[24].
The goal of an identification algorithm is to determine whether or not a circuit is
equivalent to any circuit contained in a library of circuits. Two circuits are equivalent
if and only if there exists some ordering of the inputs and outputs such that the truth
tables for both circuits are identical[24].
For small circuits, the truth table of a candidate component and a library compo-
nent may be compared directly. For larger circuits, it is not possible to even enumerate
the truth table[14].
It is worth noting that if any two circuits are structurally equivalent, they will
also be functionally equivalent. The reverse does not necessarily hold true. Consider
as an example two adders of the same size, one a conventional ripple-carry adder and
the other a carry-lookahead adder. The two are functionally equivalent, because for
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each possible input, they produce the same output (the sum of the inputs). The two
are not structurally equivalent, because they are different at the gate or transistor
level.
Identification techniques that analyze only the circuit structure to identify a circuit
are known as white-box techniques, while techniques that use only the input-output
relationships of the circuit to identify it are known as black-box techniques.
2.2.3 Invasive Techniques.
While the previously discussed exploitation techniques passively monitor the cir-
cuit to be exploited, this is not always the case. If access to a device is unrestricted, the
device may be physically tampered with. Invasive techniques require the de-packaging
of components, removing the protective packaging around the circuit. These tech-
niques have not been demonstrated against FPGAs, but the SRAM technology that
FPGAs are built on is susceptible to these attacks[25]. In order to conduct these
attacks, specialized tools are required.
2.2.4 Semi-invasive Techniques.
These techniques also require that the outer packaging of a circuit be removed,
but do not require the same level of technical equipment and expertise that invasive
techniques do. In most cases, semi-invasive techniques seek to alter the behavior of
the circuit, which may allow for the breaking of a cryptographic system. The state
of individual transistors or SRAM cells can be altered using radiation[20].
2.3 Component Identification Techniques
Three methods of component identification are presented in this section: a struc-
tural approach that has been used to identify the components in a set of benchmark
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circuits, an approach that does not rely on the structure of the circuit to analyze
components, and X-HIA, the component identification method that will be expanded
upon in the next chapter.
2.3.1 A Structural Approach.
The ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits have been reverse engineered using a structural
approach[10]. Because the approach was both successful and well-documented, it
makes an ideal case study for structural methods of component identification.
The approach used by Hansen, Halcin, and Hayes utilized eight techniques to
describe a circuit at increasingly higher levels.
• The reverse engineers began by looking for library components that were easily
recognizable. Examples of this are XOR gates constructed for basic gates,
multiplexers, and CLA generators.
• Secondly, they identified non-library logic modules that were repeated through-
out the circuit. These elements give insight as to whether or not the circuit
performs the same operation on multiple bits.
• After recognizing some of the modules in the circuit, the engineers looked for
expected circuit elements, such as an XOR gate accompanying CLA generator
logic.
• Small unidentified sections of the circuit were exhaustively analyzed. This is
only feasible for sections of the circuit with a small number of inputs.
• High fan-out signals were identified, because they are likely to be control signals.
This allows the blocks that the control signals feed to be identified more easily.
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• By grouping signals into busses, and then examining where these signals lead,
the circuit can be partitioned further.
• In the case of the ISCAS benchmarks, common names were employed for related
signals. This allowed the reverse engineers to group these signals together.
• If a block contains truly random logic, it must be represented as a black box.
The authors concluded that it is possible to reverse engineer a circuit using white-
box techniques without simply comparing the entire circuit to library circuits. They
successfully reverse-engineered circuits with over 200 input lines, and circuits with
more than 2000 logic gates. The technique they present relies on the existence of
engineers with expertise in the field of circuit design, and plenty of time to work. No
completely analytic method is presented.
2.3.2 Semantic Approaches.
An infinite number of combinational circuits can be generated that match a given
function or truth table. The proof of this is simple: assume that there were only
a finite number of circuits that could represent a given function. After these were
enumerated, add a buffer to the outputs of each of them. This will create at least
one new combinational circuit that matches the function, violating our assumption.
Therefore, there must be an infinite number of circuits to represent any function.
Given the theorem above, no syntactic matching library could ever contain every
possible circuit that could implement a function. Therefore, in order to increase the
chances of matching a circuit component to a component in the library, semantic
methods can be used. Because semantic methods focus only on circuit behavior, the
underlying implementation details do not affect the running of the algorithm.
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2.3.2.1 Doom’s Method.
Doom, White, Wojcik, and Chishold proposed a different method of component
identification. Their method relies not on finding exact structural matches, but on
finding functionally equivalent circuits. This process begins by narrowing the number
of possible candidate circuits by computing a signature for the component(function)
to be identified. This signature is not necessarily unique to the component being
identified, and all functionally equivalent components will share a signature. This
narrows the search space of equivalent components to those components sharing a
signature with the target component.
An algorithm is presented which allows for the automation of component identi-
fication. The algorithm proceeds through the following five steps:
1. Create Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) for both the component to be identi-
fied and a candidate component.
2. Compare the signature of each component. If they do not match, discard the
candidate component as a possible match.
3. Place all of the possible matches into the suspect set.
4. Search each possible correspondence for a match, using the BDD generated in
the first step.
5. Determine the legal output correspondences, which are the orderings of the
outputs for which the components are equivalent.
This method successfully identified common circuits. It was much faster than a
”brute force” method. The brute force method grows factorially as the number of
inputs increases, while this method grows exponentially (a significant improvement.)
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2.3.2.2 X-HIA.
X-hot input analysis represents one of the newest methods of identifying components[14].
The name is derived from the principal operation performed while identifying com-
ponents: recording the outputs of the circuit while driving all permutations of X
inputs high (the ”hot inputs”). While the number of permutations grows quickly as
X increases, Porter showed that X can remain small, thereby allowing for very quick
component identification compared to testing all input and output permutations in
order to match to a library component. X-HIA requires the formulation of a unique
identification strategy for each component in the library. It has not been shown that
an efficient strategy can be developed for a wide variety of components, but the re-
sults are promising. For example, an adder with n inputs can be identified using
only about 1.5n input vectors, allowing a 64-bit adder (129 inputs) to be identified
in approximately 200ns using modern testing equipment.
2.4 Component Hiding Techniques
There are several ways to classify circuit obfuscation techniques. Techniques may
be classified according to whether they defend against white-box attacks, black-box
attacks, or both. Alternately, they may be divided by whether they preserve the
original circuit semantics(the truth table) or alter it. Obfuscation methods can also
be grouped by whether they are performed once, when the circuit it created (static
methods) or occur as the circuit is being used (dynamic methods).
2.4.1 White-box methods.
White box methods necessarily involve changing gates or signals inside the cir-
cuit. Examples of transformations that could be used are increasing the number of
input bits, introducing intermediate gates to create new paths within the circuit, or
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introducing new output gates. These transformations may be carried out statically
or dynamically. Both techniques that preserve the semantic meaning of a circuit and
those that do not may defend against white-box attacks.
Typically, there are several stages to any white-box obfuscation method. First, a
gate or signal must be selected for obfuscation. Next, the obfuscation itself must be
selected (i.e. a replacement gate type). Finally, the circuit must be altered, and the
necessary information computed and stored in order to recover the original function
of the component.
2.4.2 Black-box methods.
Because black-box analysis methods rely only upon the truth table of a circuit
in order to identify it, techniques that preserve the semantics of a circuit are not
effective against black-box attacks. White box transformations that do not preserve
the original semantics (function) of the circuit may protect against black-box attacks,
as well as methods that simply alter the truth table without relying on white-box
circuit information.
2.4.3 Dynamic methods.
It is possible to create an FPGA that can be reprogrammed without halting the
operation of a circuit[22]. Alternately, a circuit may be fabricated with gates that
perform multiple functions based on the operating conditions[16]. These advances in
technology allow for the formulation of dynamic obfuscation techniques in which the
circuit is periodically modified in order to make it more difficult to identify.
One method that has been shown to help protect a circuit from unwanted analysis
is Dynamic Polymorphic Reconfiguration (DPR)[14]. This technique relies on six
functions to obfuscate the circuit:
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• GateReplace - performs a gate replacement
• SignalHide - hides a signal
• AddInput - adds an input
• AddGate - adds a gate
• AddOutput - adds an output
• StandAloneKey - creates a standalone recovery key
2.5 Cryptographic Systems
Encryption and decryption of information is absolutely essential to e-commerce,
the military, and even personal computer users. Many online transactions require the
use of cryptography. Cryptography may also be used to digitally sign documents or
perform identify verification. These cryptographic systems all require the use of a
key, so methods of generating the key will first be explored, AES and RSA, two of
the most commonly used cryptographic algorithms, are presented.
2.5.1 Key Generation and Protection.
All modern cryptographic methods rely on the use of a secure key. If this key
is compromised, the security of the entire system is compromised, regardless of the
particular algorithm used[17]. If the system can by analyzed sufficiently, the key may
be able to be read out of a cryptosystem directly. If this were to occur, the security
of the system would be negated.
Key generation techniques fall into two categories: random and pseudo-random.
Random bitstreams are difficult to produce, but cannot be accurately predicted by an
adversary. Pseudo-random bitstreams are easy to produce using a variety of methods,
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XOR
Figure 2. 4-bit LFSR
but can be predicted if some information is known. Many pseudo-random number/bit-
stream generators rely on some sort of seed value. One commonly used pseudo-random
number generator is a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). A LFSR is a shift regis-
ter with the input connected to some combination of the current bits in the register.
Typically, some of the bits in the register are XORed together to form the next bit
to be shifted in. An example of a LFSR is shown in Figure 2.
A LFSR can be described by an associated polynomial. The coefficients of the
polynomial are either 0 or 1, and indicate which bits of the shift register are to be
”tapped” in order to form the input bit. The polynomial for the shift register shown
in Figure 2 is shown in Equation 1.
x3 + x1 + 1 (1)
2.5.2 AES.
The advanced encryption standard (AES) is currently used by the US Government
to protect sensitive and classified information. AES operates on 128 bits of ciphertext
or plaintext at a time and uses either a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit key to perform the
encryption or decryption[3]. AES consists of five functions, each of which is repeated
depending on the size of the key used. If the circuit components that implement these
functions can be identified, the key can be recovered. The five functions used in AES
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are:
• KeyExpansion - This function is only performed once. It is the first function to
be performed when an encryption or decryption operation begins. It takes as
an input the 128-, 192-, or 256-bit AES key and generates 10, 12, or 14 round
keys depending on the key length.
• AddRoundKey - This function takes as an input 2 128-bit operands. It performs
a bitwise XOR operation and returns the result.
• SubBytes - This function takes as an input a 4 × 4 array of bytes. Each byte
is replaced by another according to a non-linear lookup table referred to as the
substitution box, or S-box.
• ShiftRows - This function takes as an input a 4×4 array of bytes. It shifts each
byte in the second row to the left by one position, each byte in the third row
left by two positions, and each byte in the fourth row left by three positions.
• MixColumns - This function takes as an input a 4 × 4 array of bytes. Each
column of the array is multiplied by a fixed polynomial.
Each of these functions can easily be implemented in hardware, or using an 8-
bit microprocessor. If implemented in hardware, each component can be attacked
separately. Once the signals that correspond to the key are identified, the security
of the system is compromised. If the round keys are even partially discovered, the
original key can be recovered[9].
Encryption and decryption are performed using the same hardware on AES, using
the same key. Because the same key encrypts and decrypts a message, it is known as a
symmetric key algorithm. The re-use of the same hardware implies that if encryption
can be protected from exploitation, so can decryption.
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2.5.3 RSA.
RSA is a public-key cryptographic algorithm. As such, two keys are generated,
one for encryption and one for decryption. Only one of these must be kept private,
the other is made freely available.
The basis for any RSA implementation is modular exponentiation. This is a fairly
simple mathematical operation. The repetition required to implement it makes some
RSA hardware very vulnerable to attacks, particularly side-channel attacks.
2.6 Summary
Reconfigurable hardware simplifies the design process by allowing designers to
rapidly iterate through prototype designs. Unfortunately, they are vulnerable to
many of the same attack methods that conventional ASIC circuitry are vulnerable
to, as well as some vulnerabilities introduced by the design process for reconfigurable
hardware. Two of the more direct attacks are black-box and white-box component
analysis. Several examples of these attacks were presented, as well as the existing
methods of countering the attacks. Finally, the crypographic systems that can be
implemented in hardware and may need to remain secure are discussed.
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III. Static Circuit Vulnerabilities
This chapter describes a component identification technique that can be performed
with only black-box information. The effectiveness of various static obfuscation meth-
ods in defending against this identification technique is then explored. In the next
chapter, a dynamic protection technique will be developed using some of the same
circuit transformations in order to further protect a component from identification.
The desired output of an identification routine varies depending on the application.
If a supplier goes out of business, or the original specification of a system is lost, then
all that is necessary is to be able to replicate the original hardware. For this purpose,
simply knowing the truth table or circuit netlist is sufficient, because tools exist that
can implement a circuit given only the truth table or netlist. On the other hand, if the
goal is to understand the working of the circuit (perhaps to locate the key, or check
to ensure that no additional hardware was added by an untrustworthy manufacturer)
then more knowledge is required. Simply knowing the truth table does not suffice;
knowing that the truth table of the component matches the truth table of a multiplier
is much more useful.
To define a circuit by applying all possible inputs and recording the outputs (enu-
merating the truth table line by line) is not feasible. For a circuit with 60 binary input
lines, this discovery process would take approximately thirty-six thousand years us-
ing a gigahertz tester. Circuits or programs are often composed of common building
blocks. This can stem from design processes used by engineers, who are used to
working with these components, or from the automated translation from a high-level
language to a circuit description. As a result, the search space for an unidentified
circuit can be significantly smaller than 2n, where n is the number of inputs. An
algorithm to identify these common components quickly is presented here.
Several methods have been proposed for protecting circuits. These circuit transfor-
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mations are performed once, at design time. They seek to change the implementation
of the circuit from one that can be easily identified to one that is difficult to iden-
tify. These transformations are described and their effectiveness against the matching
techniques presented is evaluated.
3.1 A general identification method
Circuitry can be broken down into combinational and sequential elements. In a
combinational circuit, the output depends only on the current inputs. In a sequential
circuit, the output may depend on the past inputs in additional to the current ones.
As a result, sequential circuits are much more difficult to analyze than combinational
circuits. Sequential circuits may be broken down into flip-flops with combinational
circuitry in between. If the combinational portion can be protected, then the sequen-
tial circuit is protected.
Many circuit analysis techniques approach the identification problem rather blindly.
Significant increases in performance have been achieved by classifying inputs and
outputs into narrow containers prior to the matching algorithm being run[8]. This
narrows the search space considerably.
This identification method expands on these techniques by taking into account
the likely function of a circuit. Once a likely function is identified, the following steps
are tailored to identifying the inputs and outputs of that particular function. If the
identification fails, the identifier moves on to the next most likely function, and runs
a sequence tailored to that function. If all possible functions are tested and fail, then
the algorithm has failed to identify the component.
By following a systematic, easily automated process, the components can be iden-
tified using far fewer steps than conventional brute force attacks. This process can
be divided into four steps: input/output identification, input/output space analysis,
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input/output partitioning, and bit ordering and correspondence discovery. This tech-
nique builds upon that presented by Porter in [14] and described briefly in Chapter
II.
3.1.1 Input/Output Identification.
As all black-box analysis techniques rely upon the ability to force an input and
measure an output, identification of each pin as either an input or an output is
a necessary first step. This is easily accomplished using modern technology and
techniques.
The ideal electronic device has the following characteristics: infinite input resis-
tance and zero output resistance. While in practice no device can be fabricated that
meets this standard, the input resistance is several orders of magnitude higher than
the output resistance.
It is possible for Automatic Test Equipment(ATE) to quickly measure the re-
sponse of a pin to small currents (100 - 250 µA) without damaging the pins. This
measurement allows for the identification of a pin as either an input or an output[5].
When using reconfigurable hardware such as an FPGA, this process may be sim-
plified. If any of the original design information is available, it is likely that the I/O
configuration will be stored and can simply be read from the file. If not, the same
techniques that are used to analyze ASIC circuitry can be utilized.
3.1.2 Input/Output Space Analysis.
Analysis of the I/O space allows for a probabilistic classification of a circuit, that
is, it does not absolutely determine the function of a component, but it does lend
itself to determining the likely function of the circuit. This in turn allows the search
routine to test the most likely functions first, greatly improving the efficiency of the
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Table 1. Expected Input/Output Ratios
Device Input and Output Information
Name Input Pins Output Pins Ratio
n-input gate n 1 n
1
= n
m-bit adder 2m + 1 m + 1 2m+1
m+1
≈ 2
k : 1 m-bit MUX km + dlog2ke m km+dlog2kem ≈ k
m-bit multiplier 2m 2m 2m
2m
= 1
decoder n 2n n
2n
< 1
algorithm. Both the number and ratio of input and output pins yields information
about the likely function of a circuit.
Comparison of the input/output space of a circuit to Table 1 shrinks the number of
likely circuit candidates. However, in many cases there will still be multiple candidate
circuits. For example, It is impossible to distinguish between the 1-bit 2:1 multiplexer
and a 3-input logic gate by looking only at the number of inputs and outputs. For this
reason, an IO Signature is created for each component in the library. IO Signatures
of different components can be compared. Candidate functions can then be ordered
from most likely to least likely, and tested in that order.
3.1.3 Input/Output Partitioning.
Input/Output Partitioning organizes the inputs and outputs such that related bits
are grouped together. For example, the inputs of a division unit could be grouped
into a divisor and a dividend.
Symmetric Groups are groups whose labels may be exchanged without affect-
ing the function of the circuit. Examples of circuits that contain symmetric groups
are commutative mathematical functions, such as addition and multiplication. Sym-
metric groups will be labeled Group A, Group B, etc during the labeling process.
Asymmetric Groups are groups that are not symmetric, such as a group of control
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lines on a multiplexer, or the operands of a divider. Asymmetric groups will be given
distinct labels corresponding to their function within the circuit.
3.1.4 Bit Ordering and Correspondences.
For some circuits, the ordering (significance) of bits within a group can be deter-
mined (as in an adder or multiplier). In others, such as a multiplexer, no ordering
can be made within a group.
If the order of the lines within a group can be established, then the lines of Group
A (containing m lines) will be referred to with increasing order of significance as
a0, a1, ..., am−1. If the absolute ordering cannot be established, but it can be estab-
lished that bits in different groups share significant positions, then these bits will be
said to correspond with each other.
In some cases, particularly with control lines, the order cannot be established, but
the effect of particular logic values upon the operation of a circuit can be established.
As an example, the ordering of the control lines of a 4:1 multiplexer cannot be estab-
lished, but the combination (0, 0) may lead to group A being selected, (1, 0) lead to
group B being selected, and so forth. In this case, a table or other expedient method
of presenting this information will be given.
3.1.5 Process Flow.
Figure 3 shows the overall process flow for identifying a component. First, a
proper subcircuit must be selected. This subcircuit corresponds to a likely library
component. Depending on how the subcircuit was identified, it may be necessary
to examine it to discover the function of each pin: either power, ground, input, or
output. This step is only necessary when working with ASIC components. Then,
the inputs and outputs are partitioned and bit order/correspondences are verified as
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Figure 3. Process Flowchart
described above. These steps are repeated until the component is identified, or no
more information can be gathered.
3.2 Static Protection Analysis
Static transformations can be grouped into three categories: those that alter cir-
cuit semantics but not the number of input or output bits, those that add input and/or
output lines without altering the semantics of the original inputs and outputs, and
those that alter both the input/output count and circuit semantics. Obfuscation tech-
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niques may also be categorized depending on what level of circuit description they
act on. Techniques that only rely only upon the truth table for the circuit description
are black box techniques, while those that require information about circuit structure
are white box techniques.
Semantic preserving techniques allow the circuit to still perform the original func-
tion (such as encryption) with no extra recovery circuitry. If the circuit semantics
are not preserved, then additional circuitry must be added in order to recover the
original function.
3.2.1 Semantic-Preserving Techniques.
In order to obfuscate a circuit while preserving the original semantics, additional
inputs and/or outputs must be added to the circuit.
3.2.1.1 Addition of input bits.
Several input bits can be added to the circuit such that when the correct com-
bination is applied, the function of the original circuit is unchanged. Every other
combination will result in a different function being performed. In effect, there is a
combinational lock on the circuit, and the circuit will not work properly unless the
correct combination is presented.
Consider a component with n inputs and m outputs. If the component is one of
the components analyzed above, the number of input vectors required to analyze the
component is a polynomial function of n. Extra inputs can be added to a circuit to
form a sort of combinational lock. When the correct combination is applied to these
inputs, the circuit will function in its original manner. When an incorrect combination
is applied, the outputs of the circuit will be garbled. When a combinational lock of
size k bits is added to the component, the analysis tool must first identify which input
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bits make up the combinational lock. If n, k, and the correct key are known, then the
identification routine must be run (n + k)(n + k − 1)...(n + 1) > nk times in order to
test every possible permutation of input bits of size k. On average, half of the possible
permutations will have to be tested before the key bits are located. Even with all
information given to the component identification algorithm other than which inputs
form the key, the asymptotic complexity of the identification algorithm is increased
by a factor of nk. This is a significant increase, considering that the asymptotic
complexity of identifying an adder is O(n) and that of identifying a multiplier is
O(n2) (see Chapter IV).
While the addition of the combinational lock adds security while adding relatively
few inputs to the circuit, care must be taken with the implementation of such a
system. In order to meet the assumptions listed above, the circuit must behave
differently for each combination applied to the lock bits. This can be accomplished
by replacing gates with polymorphic gates (described in detail in Chapter IV). This
may cause the size of the circuit to grow significantly when the lock is added to the
circuit. The analysis above assumes that only black-box information about the circuit
is available. If white-box analysis is able to identify the lock bits, significantly less
security is added to the system. Similarly, if the adversary can observe the operation
of the circuit in a larger system and determine the proper input combination to apply
to the lock, the lock adds no security.
3.2.1.2 Adding Output Bits.
The addition of output bits will not significantly affect the algorithms presented
previously. The additional outputs will simply be considered unidentified, but the
original circuit will still be identified.
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3.2.2 Non-Semantic-Preserving Techniques.
As demonstrated in the previous section, semantic-preserving techniques can offer
only a limited amount of real-world protection. Therefore, techniques that alter the
semantic description of the circuit should be employed in order to increase protection.
The transformations can be made in two different ways. An existing semantic
description of the circuit(i.e. a truth table) can be altered directly or a syntac-
tic/structural description of the circuit can be altered. Each set of techniques has
advantages and disadvantages.
3.2.2.1 Line inversion.
The simplest black-box transformation inverts the outputs on certain lines of the
truth table. Inverting every line would result in the trivial transformation of the
circuit from one with active-high outputs to active-low outputs, or vice-verse. A
non-trivial transformation utilizes an inversion schedule. This schedule determines
whether or not a line of the truth table can be inverted. In practice, this may be ac-
complished through a boolean function which determines whether nor not the output
is inverted based on the input. This is equivalent to the replacement of a primary
output with a 2-input XOR gate with one input connected to the previous output
and one input connected to a combinational logic block or key that selects when that
output is to be inverted. Therefore, it can be analyzed in the same manner as a
gate addition obfuscation strategy, and has the capability to successfully obfuscate a
circuit.
3.2.2.2 Column Exchange.
While row exchange can be applied to the truth table as a whole, column exchange
must be applied to only certain rows. This is because inputs and outputs are con-
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Figure 4. Column Exchange Operation
sidered in arbitrary order by most identification algorithms. An example of column
exchange may be to change the order of bits in an operand depending on the parity
of that operand, possibly confusing algorithmic attempts to order the bits within
that operand. Alternately, columns could be permuted based on the hamming weight
of the input. Figure 4 demonstrates the results of column exchange on a 3-input,
2-output circuit. The columns have been exchanged in the highlighted area.
Performing column exchange is equivalent to the addition of polymorphic switches
(see Chapter IV) that are controlled by internal circuit signals (instead of additional
pseudo-primary inputs). The algorithm for component identification presented in this
chapter is defeated if non-trivial exchanges are performed. Non-trivial exchanges are
those that exchange inputs or outputs that do not share logical significance. In other
words, the exchange must alter the truth table. In order for the original intent to be
recovered, the exchange operation must be performed again before the outputs are
used.
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3.3 Summary
In this chapter, a black-box component identification method was described. Sev-
eral white- and black-box transformations intended to protect a component from
being identified were presented, and their effectiveness against this new identifica-
tion method was estimated. If the component identification method can identify
many common components, static protection will not provide enough security to
make component identification infeasible.
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IV. Dynamic Techniques
Dynamic protection techniques can be used to enhance the protection offered by
static defenses. It may be possible to provide additional protection while still consum-
ing fewer resources if implemented properly. This chapter describes the requirements
of such a dynamic component hiding solution, presents one possible method by which
such a solution could be realized, and outlines a method of implementing and testing
this method on an FPGA.
Regardless of the algorithms used to identify a circuit, certain bounds are not
likely to be broken. When performing black-box identification, the function of each
input pin must be identified. This suggests that even the world’s best attacker would
be forced to apply at least as many input vectors as there are input pins and record
the results for analysis. Therefore, the theoretical minimum number of input vec-
tors required to identify a n-input circuit is n vectors. This seems to hold true for
even simple components, such as an adder (the required number of input vectors is
only about 50 percent higher than this theoretical minimum.) For even the most
complicated circuitry, there are upper bounds to the difficulty of circuit identifica-
tion. Regardless of circuit function, the truth table for a combinational circuit can
be enumerated in 2n cycles, where n is the number of inputs.
The bounding of static solutions leads to a dynamic approach. The bounds on
the number of cycles necessary to identify a given circuit dictate the requirements
for a dynamic system. In addition, the frequency of reconfiguration is of critical
importance. If reconfiguration occurs infrequently so that each configuration can be
fully analyzed and understood by an adversary, then the dynamic system provides
little or no additional security. If the reconfiguration occurs much more frequently
than necessary, then unnecessary overhead (measured in wasted clock cycles and
power consumption) is incurred in order to implement the security measure. If the
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proper frequency is selected, then maximum security can be provided at the lowest
possible cost.
4.1 Requirements and Constraints
4.1.1 Adaptability to a Key.
Prior to each reconfiguration, a change or changes must be made to the circuit.
The method of selecting these changes is subject to the same trade-off as the change
selection methods for a static implementation. If changes are too predictable, then
more information is leaked from the system. If changes are too random, it is possible
that no additional security will be added. For this reason, a key will be used to
determine the changes made to the system. There are several reasons for this. First,
as long as the key is properly protected, the changes being made are unpredictable
to an adversary. Second, use of a key allows for the repetition of a set of changes,
which is useful when analyzing a system that may be used. Third, if some sort of
hardware signature (digital fingerprint) is available, this may be used to generate the
key. This will allow for a system to work predicably on a given piece of hardware, but
if a design is stolen and applied to a different piece of hardware, then it will not work
as expected, further complicating the task of replicating the function of a component.
4.1.2 Recoverability.
In most cases, the original semantic intent of the circuit must be recoverable.
This is analogous to the ability of an encrypted message to be decrypted. In very
limited situations, such as ”shredding” a component to protect it from compromise,
the intent does not have to be recoverable. Due to the protection of a key (i.e. if the
key is lost, a circuit is effectively shredded), this research focuses on techniques that
allow for the recovery of the original circuit semantics.
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4.2 Gate Replacement
Gate replacement essentially involves 2 steps: selecting a gate to be replaced and
selecting a replacement gate. Each of these steps can be accomplished dynamically
using a key-based system. Gates can be numbered in a predictable fashion using
netlist IDs or circuit layering techniques. Assuming that only AND, OR, XOR, and
their inverse gates are allowed, all gate types can be represented using 3 bits. Then,
a portion of the key can be used to select the gate that will be replaced, and the next
3 bits can be used to determine the replacement gate type. If the key is partitioned
into 16 bit sections, then circuits with up to 8192 gates can be obfuscated.
This is no different from random gate selection and replacement; it does not guar-
antee that the gate replacement makes the circuit harder to identify. This technique
relies on the sheer number of replacements being made to obfuscate the circuit, in-
stead of the quality of individual transformations.
There is a limitation of this technique: after a few replacement operations the key
will be exhausted. Even a relatively large 1024 bit key will only last for 64 iterations.
This can be overcome by using the key value supplied to generate a much longer key
bitstream. This method is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
4.3 Input and/or Output Reordering
Because of the nature of black-box identification algorithms, changing the order
if inputs or outputs once does not affect the running of the algorithm. Changing the
order dynamically can dramatically affect the results. Take an adder for example. In
the algorithm presented previously, the least significant bits of the input and output
are the first identified. If the bits change order midway through the identification of
the adder, then the process of identification must begin again. Repeatedly changing
the order of input or output lines can prevent an attacker from ever gaining a full
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picture of the operation of the adder.
This can be implemented using a key as well. For example, consider a crossbar
switch inserted in series with the component to be obfuscated. If the switch is inserted
before the component, any possible ordering of the inputs is possible. Similarly, if
the switch is inserted after the component, any possible ordering of the outputs is
possible. The key can serve as the input to the switch. Assuming that the component
proceeding or preceding the obfuscated component also has access to the key, the lines
can be re-ordered as necessary so that the circuit still functions correctly.
The same problems with key length arise when reordering is used. There are n!
possible ordering of n lines, so if every possible ordering is possible, a large key will
be needed to select even one ordering.
4.4 Row Exchange and Line Inversion
As presented in the previous chapter, the row exchange and line inversion opera-
tions can be an effective obfuscation techniques. When properly applied, properties
such as parity can be hidden.
With the advent of reconfigurable hardware, this operation is fairly easy to com-
plete. Because FPGAs use lookup tables to implement the desired operations, the
outputs of these LUTs can simply be exchanged or complemented. Implementation
without run-time reconfigurable hardware requires the addition of many gates to the
circuit, increasing the area used, power consumed, and the delay through the compo-
nent.
Selection of proper rows to swap or invert is a tremendous hurdle that makes this
operation difficult to implement. The number of rows in a truth table grows exponen-
tially as the number of inputs is increased. The number of possible orderings grows
factorially as the number of rows is increased. Therefore, this cannot be implemented
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except on very small cut-sets.
4.5 Polymorphic Gates and Networks
One method of implementing a key based system is the use of polymorphic gates.
A polymorphic gate can be formed by replacing any 2-input gate with a multiplexer.
The gate’s inputs will become the MUX select lines, while the inputs to the MUX will
become the additional input lines. An example showing an AND gate, a polymorphic
gate, and a polymorphic gate acting as an AND gate is shown in Figure 5. Adding a
single polymorphic gate can add as many as 4 key bits to the circuit. By tying the
middle two inputs of the MUX together any of the 6 basic gate types can be formed
while only adding 3 inputs to the circuit. If several polymorphic gates are added,
then a key of reasonable size can be added to the circuit in a very simple manner, as
demonstrated in Figure 6. Implemented statically, this functions as a combinational
lock. Inverters can be introduced between the input of the circuit and the MUX if
desired.
Polymorphic gates are very adaptable, and require a very low overhead. Poly-
morphic gates can be implemented using 11 primitive gates, including inverters. In
comparison, an XOR can be implemented using 4 NAND gates. The cost to convert a
primitive gate to a polymorphic gate is 10 gates, while the cost of converting an XOR
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Figure 6. Adding A Key to a Half Adder
gate is only 7 gates. Additionally, they are equally easy to implement in both ASIC
designs and reconfigurable hardware. The maximum delay through the polymorphic
gate is 4 gate delays plus 2 inverter delays, so care must be taken if the gate is inserted
into the critical path. If the gate is not inserted into the critical path then the circuit
timing will likely remain unaffected.
Polymorphic switches may also be used. A 2-input, 2-output switch requires a
single control line. The operation of such a switch is shown in Figure 7.
Polymorphic switches can be connected to form polymorphic networks. An exam-
ple of how a LFSR could be used to form a polymorphic network that switches the
order of inputs over time is shown in Figure 8. When combined with the obfuscated
half adder, a dynamically changing, obfuscated, circuit is formed, shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 8. A Dynamically Changing Polymorphic Network
4.5.1 32-Bit Adder Cost Analysis.
In order to estimate the cost of polymorphically obfuscating a component, a 32-
bit adder is examined. As a basis, a ripple-carry adder using 32 full adders, each
constructed from 2-input gates, is used. Assuming that one gate from each adder is
randomly selected to be replaced, the increase in area and delay through the adder
is computed. Table 2 gives the results of replacing each gate in the circuit with a
polymorphic gate, and Table 3 gives the best case, worst case, and average increases
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in area and critical path delay if random gate selection is used to replace a single gate
in each circuit. The critical path of a ripple-carry adder is through the carry chain, so
only the delay from the carry-in to the carry-out is considered. Approximately 80%
penalty is expected to be incurred by replacing one gate in each adder.
4.6 Polymorphic Key Generation
It is not always possible for the user to provide extremely large secure keys. Gener-
ating long streams of random numbers is a complex and difficult process. Even if large
secure bitstreams are available, entering the key into a device could be significantly
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Table 2. Gate Replacement Costs
Gate Replaced Delay (gates) % Increase Area (gates) % Increase
None 2 0 % 11 0 %
XOR1 2 0 % 18 63.4 %
XOR2 2 0 % 18 63.4 %
AND1 2 0 % 21 90.9 %
AND2 6 200 % 21 90.9 %
OR 6 200 % 21 90.9 %
Table 3. Adder Cost Analysis
% Increase in Delay % Increase in Area
Best Case 0 % 63.4 %
Worse Case 200 % 90.9 %
Average 80 % 79.9 %
more difficult than any other operation that the device was designed to perform. If
the key is generated from some sort of hardware signature, the area consumed by the
generator grows with the signature size. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to use
the supplied key as a starting point, and have the dynamic obfuscation unit generate
its own bitstream.
4.6.1 Truly Random Bitstream Generation.
The generation of a truly random bitstream is possible. If random noise is sampled,
a random bitstream is produced. This is not feasible for most applications because
it requires specialized hardware and a source of randomness. An example of a good
source of random noise is the emission of a star.
Even if it is possible to generate a random bitstream, it is not necessarily desirable.
In order for the original circuit semantics to be retained, the key bits would have to be
provided to some sort of correction unit. If these key bits were read by an adversary,
the alterations to the circuit could be reversed and the circuit no longer obfuscated.
40
4.6.2 Pseudo-random Bitstream Generation.
Various methods of generating pseudo-random bitstreams are available. This im-
plementation uses a 64-bit LFSR to generate the key. The LSFR is initially seeded
with a key of the user’s choice. At whatever intervals the user desires, the LFSR can
be stepped through all possible 64-bit patterns.
Several options are available as to how the polymorphic key is used. One method
would be to have the initial seed hard-coded into the device. The user would have
to provide a correction key in order for the device to function properly. After a set
number of clock cycles, or perhaps a number depending on the inputs to the device,
the next 64 bit key would be generated by the LFSR, and the user would have to
provide a correction key for the new key. In this way, only a user that knows both
the initial seed, LFSR configuration, and proper operating key would be able to use
the device.
4.7 Level Of Protection
Consider a component with n inputs and m outputs. If the component is one of
the components analyzed above the number of input vectors required to analyze the
component is a polynomial function of n. When a combinational lock of size k bits is
added to the component, it was previously shown that the number of vectors required
to identify the circuit grew by a factor approximating 0.5nk. Given an 8-bit adder
(16 inputs) with a 4-bit combinational lock, the circuit could likely be identified using
49152 input vectors, taking approximately 50 microseconds using a 1 GHz tester. Let
Ti be the number of vectors required to identify the circuit before the combinational
lock was applied (the identification period).
When that circuit is implemented polymorphically, the location of the key bits as
well as the key can change with each circuit evolution. Even if the circuit semantics
41
remain unaltered, the identification problem is made much more difficult. Assume
that after Tp (the polymorphic period) inputs are applied, the circuit is altered. Then
in order to identify the circuit, only Tp traces are available. Assume that Tp > Ti, so
each evolution of the circuit has the potential be fully identified.
After testing x configurations, the probability of having guessed the correct key
configuration are computed by Equation 2. During any given circuit evolution, only
Tp/Ti configurations can be tested. If the adder described above evolves every 1000
clock cycles, then the probability of it being identified during any clock cycle is about
.000636.
P ≈ 1 − (1 − (nk − x)−1)x (2)
4.8 Evaluation
In order to demonstrate that DPR is a viable solution for protecting hardware, an
evaluation platform must be constructed, and then DPR must be tested. First, the
evaluation platform itself is described, followed by the general testing methodology.
4.8.1 Evaluation Platform.
Due to the cost and time associated with ASIC manufacturing techniques, and the
lack of reconfigurable computing platforms that support full run-time reconfiguration,
a system for testing both dynamic and static techniques is necessary. This system
must meet the following requirements:
• The system must be able to be implemented on a readily available commercial
FPGA
• The system must be able to take input from the user, and be able to provide
feedback
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• The system must be able to test multiple obfuscation strategies on multiple
base circuits
The system that was created for test is shown in Figure 10.
The test bench is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FX series FPGA. A ML507
development and evaluation board is used, which contains a XC5VFX70TFFG1136
FPGA and supporting hardware. The components making up the obfuscation test
bench are described here:
• The PowerPC is a 32-bit microprocessor that is able to interface with the FPGA
on Xilinx FX series boards. The PowerPC interfaces via a bus with both the
RS-232 serial UART and the polymorphic component. It receives input from
and returns information to the user via the UART, and provides the inputs and
records the outputs of the component under test via the polymorphic compo-
nent.
• The UART is a RS-232 compliant serial UART that allows for bidirectional
communication with any laptop or desktop computer with the correct port.
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• The Poly Component is a wrapper for the component under test (CUT). It
includes registers for storing the operands that the CUT will operate on, the
polymorphic key, the result returned by the CUT, the current status, and the
control commands from the PowerPC. Any type of combinational or sequential
component can be contained inside of this wrapper, with any sort of obfuscation
technique applied to it.
4.8.2 Evaluation Methodology.
Obfuscated and non-obfuscated hardware will be compared by first implementing
a non-obfuscated component, and verifying its functionality. The area used by the
component and its speed will be recorded. Then, the component will be obfuscated,
and again the functionality will be verified. The area and speed of the obfuscated
component will then be compared to that of the original component in order to
quantify the cost of the obfuscation.
4.9 Summary
A previously presented method of dynamically protecting components was refined
so that it is suitable for implementation on an FPGA. The requirements of any im-
plementation were proposed, and a set circuit alterations that could realize DPR was
demonstrated. The additional protection achieved by these alterations, and the over-
head required to implement them, were estimated. Finally, a system was described
that will allow DPR to be tested on an FPGA.
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V. Results
5.1 X-HIA Extension Results
The steps outlined in Chapter III were followed in identifying an adder, multi-
plexer, multiplier, and primitive gate. Each component was successfully identified.
For clarity, the flowchart describing the identification process is shown again in Fig-
ure 11. The results, in terms of information gleaned and required number of input
vectors, is presented at the end of this section.
5.1.1 Circuit 1: 4-bit Adder.
The first circuit to be identified is a 14-pin circuit (excluding power and ground
connections). The circuit is shown in Figure 12.
5.1.1.1 Input/Output Identification.
The procedure previously described was followed, yielding the information listed
in Figure 13. The pin numbers listed are arbitrary.
5.1.1.2 Input/Output Space Analysis.
There are 9 input pins and 5 output pins. Referencing Table 1, likely circuit
candidates are an adder or a multiplexer. Because the number of input and output
lines correspond exactly to a 4-bit adder with carry, an adder is selected as the
most likely component. If the identification stalls under that assumption, the list of
probable components will be expanded until a suitable ID is found.
45
no
Done
Identified?
Bit Order &
Correspondence
I/O
Partitioning
I/O Space
Analysis
I/O
Identification
Subcircuit
Selection
Figure 11. Process Flowchart
5.1.1.3 Input/Output Partitioning.
A generalized technique for partitioning circuits and finding bit ordering is X-hot-
input analysis (X-HIA), where X refers to the number of input lines that are logically
high at one time. X-HIA relies on the application of inputs such that small groups or
individual signals can be identified as having an effect on specific outputs. Through
1-HIA, where a single input signal is high, it is possible to determine relationships
between the inputs and outputs. These relationships are shown in Figure 14.
From the 1-HIA results, groupings can be established. The inputs can be divided
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Figure 12. Circuit 1. The first circuit to be identified contains 14 input and output
pins. At this point, nothing is known about the circuit other than this count.
into four groups: LSB (pins 4, 5, and 6), group1 (pins 1 and 9), group2 (pins 2 and
8), and group3 (pins 3 and 7). The group LSB contains the 2 least significant bits of
the inputs, as well as the carry-in. The two bits within each of the other three groups
share significance, and cannot be distinguished. The output can be divided into two
asymmetric groups: Sum and Cout.
5.1.1.4 Bit Ordering.
Some bit ordering can be found from the 1-HIA results as well. Pin 13 can be
labelled Sum0, as it is excited 3 times. Additionally, it can be determined which
groups correspond to which bits of the sum, which will be very useful later.
The next and final step of identifying the adder is to exercise each group individu-
ally. Both signals contained within group1 will be excited, then group2, then group3,
as shown in Table 4 This will determine the relative order of each of the output pins,
which will in turn determine the order of each of the input pins.
From the results above, group1 can be identified as the MSB, group2 as significant
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Figure 13. The ATE determines that Circuit 1 contains 9 input pins and 5 output pins.
Table 4. 2-HIA indicates the order of the input and output lines relative to each other
by causing a carry operation to occur
Inputs Outputs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
position 2, and group3 as position 1.
5.1.1.5 Identification.
The component was successfully identified as a 4-bit adder. A validation test(see
[5]) can be performed to confirm that the component is in fact an adder.
Due to the nature of an adder, its inputs cannot be grouped into an A input and a
B input. All that can be identified is the positional significance of each of the inputs
and outputs. The circuit can be characterized as shown in Table 5.
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Figure 14. 1-HIA Analysis shows that each of the inputs stimulates exactly one output
when applied individually.
5.1.2 Circuit 2: Multiplexer.
The second sub-circuit consists of 11 pins (again excluding power and ground con-
nections). While this circuit is small enough that the truth table could be enumerated,
the identification algorithm is used to identify it to demonstrate its feasibility.
5.1.2.1 Input/Output Identification.
The procedure listed previously was followed, indicating that the circuit contains
8 input pins and 3 output pins. The inputs are labelled 1-8, and the outputs 9-11.
5.1.2.2 Input/Output Space Analysis.
Analysis of the number and ratio of inputs and outputs would lead us to think
that this is some sort of multiplexer or encoder. Since the number of inputs and
outputs precisely matches that of an 8-3 encoder, the identification algorithm will
start assuming that the component is an encoder.
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Table 5. Circuit 1 Pin Summary
Pin Pin Group Semantic
Number Direction Assignment Meaning
1 In group1 Position 3
2 In group2 Position 2
3 In group3 Position 1
4 In LSB Position 0
5 In LSB Position 0
6 In LSB Position 0
7 In group3 Position 1
8 In group2 Position 2
9 In group1 Position 3
10 Out Sum Sum.1
11 Out Sum Sum.3
12 Out Cout Carry Out
13 Out Sum Sum.0
14 Out Sum Sum.2
Table 6. 1-HIA shows that circuit 2 is not an encoder, but may be a multiplexer
Input Output
Excited Excited
1 10
2 -
3 -
4 11
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 -
5.1.2.3 Bit Ordering: First Pass.
An encoder consists of only two groups: input and output. Therefore, no further
group analysis is needed for an encoder.
Pin identification of an encoder is simple: perform 1-HIA analysis and record the
output combination. The encoder is then completely described. The results of 1-HIA
can be seen in Table 6.
From the 1-HIA analysis, the component is clearly not a simple encoder. However,
the results are consistent with a 2-bit-wide MUX (with at least one extra pin). The
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Table 7. 2-HIA shows that pins 7 and 8 are the MUX control lines
Input Output
Excited Excited
1-2 10
1-3 10
1-5 10
1-6 10
1-7 -
1-8 -
Table 8. Circuit 2 Control Analysis
Input Control Value
Excited (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
2 10 - 9
3 - 10 9
5 11 - 9
6 - 11 9
identification process will continue to see if the component could possibly be clas-
sified as a multiplexer. Proceeding with this new information, the process of group
identification must be repeated.
5.1.2.4 Group Identification and Bit Ordering.
From the 1-HIA analysis, pins 1 and 11 will be classified as group A, and pins
10 and 11 placed into group Out. One of these will be held high, and then 2-HIA
performed, pulling one other pin high at a time, and recording the results.
From the first round of 2-HIA, inputs 7 and 8 can be grouped together in the
group Control. Now, for each possible permutation that can be placed on the control
line, each of the other un-grouped inputs will be enabled, one at a time. The results
are given in Table 8.
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Table 9. Circuit 2 Pin Summary
Pin Pin Group Semantic
Number Direction Assignment Meaning
1 In A A.0
2 In B B.0
3 In C C.0
4 In A A.1
5 In B B.1
6 In C C.1
7 In Control Control Line
8 In Control Control Line
9 Out Unassigned Invalid Indicator
10 Out Out Out.0
11 Out Out Out.1
5.1.2.5 Identification.
These results confirm that the component does in fact act like a multiplexer. An
automated system would likely ignore the extra output line, for the sake of simplicity.
Manual analysis shows that this extra line is an ”invalid” indicator, since only 3 of
the 4 possible control line settings are valid.
The analysis of this component demonstrates the iterative nature of the identi-
fication process. Some steps, particularly group identification and pin ordering, are
repeated several times as more information is gleaned about the circuit.
A summary of the information that is learned about Circuit 2 is given in Table 9.
Note that unlike the adder, in which the ordering of the inputs could be determined
but not the partitioning, in this case the partitioning can be determined but no
ordering information can be found.
5.1.3 Circuit 3: Multiplier.
The final circuit to be analyzed in this paper contains 16 bits.
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5.1.3.1 Input/Output Identification.
The procedure listed previously was followed. The circuit contains 8 inputs, la-
belled 1-8, and 8 outputs, labelled 9-16.
5.1.3.2 Input/Output Space Analysis.
Referring to Table 1, the circuit is likely a 4-bit × 4-bit multiplier.
5.1.3.3 Input/Output Partitioning.
Performing 1-HIA upon the circuit does not cause any outputs to be excited,
which is consistent with the assumption that the circuit is a multiplier. Holding the
first input line high, and ”walking” a one down the rest of the inputs, allows the
inputs to be partitioned into group A and group B. If the first input line is placed in
group A, then all input lines do not cause an output line to be excited can be placed
in group A as well, and those that do can be placed in group B.
5.1.3.4 Bit Ordering and Correspondences.
To find which bits in groups A and B share logical significance, first one group,
then the other, must be held to the pattern 1111, and 1-HIA performed on the other
group. The results are recorded, and the test repeated again, with the two groups
interchanged. Bits that cause the same output pattern when excited share logical
significance.
This process also allows for the MSB of the output, designated out7, to be deter-
mined. It is the only bit never to be excited in the previous test. The determination
of out7 allows a0, b0, a3, and b3 to be found. This is accomplished by holding all
bits of A to be logical 1, and performing 2-HIA upon B. b3 will be high during all
combinations that excite out7. Only 1 bit, namely b0, can be excited along with b3
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without causing out7 to be excited. Because the correspondences between the two
input groups are known, the least and most significant bits of A are now known as
well.
By counting the number of times each bit went high during the modified 1-HIA
analysis, output bits can be assigned two possible positions. Multiplying 1111 by 1
allows for the determination of the lower 4 bit positions(with no ordering), and so
yields the significance of each output bit. This knowledge, along with the LSB of one
of the inputs, allows for the significance of every input bit to be determined.
5.1.3.5 Identification.
The component is fully identified as a multiplier. Both the partitioning of the
inputs, and the order of the bits, are completely discovered.
5.1.4 Circuit 4: Logic Gates.
Any of the 4 primitive logic gates(AND, OR, NAND, and NOR) of arbitrary input
size may be identified with only 2 tests applied. If XOR gates are treated as primitive
gates, then even/odd parity gates can be detected with the addition of one more test,
for a total of 3.
The zero response of a gate may be defined as the output of the gate when all
inputs are forced to logic zero. Only a single test vector, comprised of all zeros, is
required to determine the zero response.
After determining the zero response of a gate, first 1 arbitrary input bit, then 2
should be pulled high. Table 10 indicates that 3 test vectors (all zeros, a single 1,
and two 1s) can differentiate between 6 different gates.
54
Table 10. Logic Gate Properties
Gate Type Zero Response 1-HIA Response 2-HIA Response
AND 0 0 0
OR 0 1 1
XOR 0 1 0
NAND 1 1 1
NOR 1 0 0
XNOR 1 0 1
Table 11. Component Identification Performance
Identification Performance
Device Partition Order Define Running
Name Input Input/ Control Time
Output Lines
n-input gate N/A N/A N/A O(1)
m-bit adder
√
N/A O(m)
k : 1 n-bit MUX
√ √
O(nk)
m-bit multiplier
√ √
N/A O(m2)
decoder N/A N/A O(2n)
5.1.5 Circuit 5: Decoder.
Due to the nature of a decoder, exhaustive testing must be performed to identify
its operation. If more information about the circuit is known, i.e. the order of the
outputs, then identification may be faster. For this reason, a decoder should be
examined as part of a larger system, such as a register file, in order to glean pertinent
information about it.
5.2 Identification Performance
Table 11 shows the capabilities of this method for identifying common components.
5.3 DPR Evaluation Results
DPR was implemented and tested. Two circuits were tested: an adder and an
AES encrypter. First, the non-obfuscated versions of each circuit were implemented
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and verified, and the area required and maximum speed were recorded. Then, the
circuits were obfuscated and verified again. The area and speed of the obfuscated
circuits was recorded and compared to the original.
5.3.1 Configuration.
The system described in Chapter IV was constructed. The key is stored in a
LFSR, in order to facilitate a simple and repeatable key pattern. A 64-bit LFSR was
used with the characteristic polynomial given in Equation 3. This is a maximal-length
LFSR[17].
x64 + x4 + x3 + x1 + 1 (3)
The PowerPC and associated busses and peripheral components all operate at 125
MHz.
5.3.2 Adder Test.
The first circuit tested was a 32-bit ripple-carry adder. This adder was constructed
using 32 full adders, each of which was constructed using five two-input gates. The
original circuit uses conventional gates, while the polymorphic version replaces every
gate with a polymorphic gate. The original and polymorphic circuits are shown in
Figure 15.
The system was tested under a variety of conditions. After proper operation was
verified, the polymorphic component was tested using a variety of keys. The results
of this test were very promising. As expected both the size of the circuit and the
maximum propagation delay increased (see Table 12). Because the increase in delay
was so small, the clock frequency of the system as a whole did not have to be changed.
Analysis of the output of the Xilinx implementation tools shows that the reason for
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Table 12. Adder Comparison
Original Adder Polymorphic Adder % Increase
FF Used 255 383 50.2%
LUTs Used 268 847 216%
Max Delay 7.936ns 7.975ns .491%
Max Freqnency 126 MHz 125 MHz -.8%
such a small increase in the delay is because the majority of the delay is a result
of signals traveling between components on the FPGA, not due to the delay of the
components.
The 32-bit adder has a 9-bit key. The identification period (the number of clock
cycles required to identify the adder) is 96 cycles. If the key is moved every 1000
clock cycles, then 10 identification attempts may be made during each polymorphic
period. The probability of identifying the adder during any given polymorphic period
is 1.11 × 10−15. If the adder is tested continuously on a 1 GHz tester (not possible
with this hardware) the probability of the adder being identified within the first year
of testing is 3.4%. The probability of the adder being identified within the first decade
of testing is 30%.
5.3.3 AES Test.
Polymorphic networks were added to a pipelined implementation of AES in order
to make it harder to identify. The order of the inputs and outputs was altered using
polymorphic switches. The component that performs the AddRoundKey operation
was altered to include polymorphic gates. This component was selected because it is
the simplest component to identify (it essentially consists of an array of XOR gates).
Proper encryption was verified when the correct key was applied. Additionally, it
was confirmed that when the key was changed, the output of the encrypter changed.
The number of clock cycles required to perform the encryption was unaltered by the
addition of the obfuscation elements. The difference in LUT and FF count utilized
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(b) Each gate replaced with a polymorphic gate, and a 9 key bits
added to the input(3 for each gate type).
Figure 15. Test Circuits
is given in Table 13. Figure 16 shows the implementation of both the original and
obfuscated AES circuit on a Virtex-5 FX FPGA. The additional logic consumed is not
visible by examining the layout of the FPGA without comparing the circuit netlists
line by line.
The modified AES encryption component was used under the same conditions as
the original encryption component. There was no observable difference in behavior
other than the changes in the order of the inputs. The alterations in order to make
the circuit dynamic appear to result in a robust and useful circuit. In the as-tested
configuration, there was no need to insert ”stalls” in the code in order to get correct
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Table 13. AES Comparison
Original Adder Polymorphic Adder % Increase
FF Used 13065 13193 .97%
LUTs Used 12870 13070 1.12%
results from the encryption unit.
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(a) Original AES Encryption circuit imple-
mented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FX FPGA. The
yellow portions are the sections of the FPGA
containing the AES circuit.
(b) Obfuscated AES Encryption circuit im-
plemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FX FPGA.
There is very little difference between the
original and obfuscated circuits.
Figure 16. AES Device Usage
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5.4 Summary
X-HIA was extended to identify several additional components: a multiplexer,
multiplier, encoder, and basic gates. The number of input vectors required to iden-
tify each of these components grows polynomially as the number of inputs grows, a
significant improvement over the exponential or factorial growth rate of previously
presented methods.
DPR was successfully implemented and tested on a commercial FPGA. The over-
head required to implement DPR was less than predicted, due to the optimization
that takes place during the FPGA design process.
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VI. Conclusion
Significant progress was made in the characterization of black-box analysis threats
and formalization of a DPR system. This chapter presents the conclusions drawn,
covers the contributions made, and provides suggestions for future work on related
topics.
6.1 Conclusions
X-HIA was extended to encompass several common circuit sub-components in-
stead of just an adder. It was successfully shown to identify a multiplier and several
simpler components in polynomial time, instead of exponential or factorial time like
other methods.
After showing that many components could be efficiently identified, static protec-
tion was applied to these components and evaluated. It was shown that the static
protection was only able to increase the order of the polynomial, not increase the
amount of time necessary to identify the current beyond the polynomial level.
Using the information gained from extending X-HIA and implementing static
protection, DPR was implemented on an FPGA and evaluated. It was shown that
the amount of time that we can expect a circuit to be identified in was increased
significantly over the amount of time required if only static protection is used. The
overhead associated with implementing DPR was measured.
The contributions made by this research are in the following areas:
• Black-box Identification - By extending X-HIA to more components, this new
identification method is shown to be viable
• Threat Characterization - Analyzing the effects of static and dynamic obfusca-
tion against X-HIA allows for a better understanding of the threats to circuitry
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• DPR System Formalization - While DPR was previously described by Porter,
no system for its use had been formalized
6.2 Future Work
The work presented here leads to several exciting future research opportunities:
white-box characterization of the polymorphic components, implementation of the
X-HIA identification algorithm, and automation of the adaptation of an arbitrary
component to DPR.
6.2.1 White-Box Characterization.
The polymorphic components added to the circuit may present a white-box vul-
nerability. If an attacker has access to white-box information about the circuit the
topology of the gates may be uncovered. This could leak information about the cir-
cuit to the adversary. In order to further protect the circuit, white-box obfuscation
may need to be performed on the circuit once it is prepared for DPR.
6.2.2 X-HIA Implementation.
Using the basic system-level framework that was used to analyze DPR, the X-HIA
process could be automated. The benefits of this would be twofold: the availability
of an efficient component identification technique and the ability to quickly quantify
the obfuscatory effects of black-box transformations.
6.2.3 Automation of DPR preparation.
Currently, a gate-level netlist must be modified by hand in order to implement
DPR. This is not practical for very large and complex circuits. This process could be
automated, significantly decreasing the amount of time necessary to protect a circuit
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and also allowing for the testing of many different selection routines against each
other.
6.2.4 Uncloneable Functions.
The latest research in digital fingerprinting allows for the generation of keys that
are linked to individual pieces of hardware. If these keys are used to control the
DPR system, then a FPGA bitstream could be generated that would only function
properly on a single device.
6.3 Summary
X-HIA can be extended to identify several common components. Static protection
techniques can slow down the identification process, but it is still feasible to identify
a component using currently available technology. DPR can be used to significantly
decrease the chances of a component being identified.
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